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Abstract
This study examines  the impact of a fee-waiver  program  rounds utilization  rates have indeed declined  despite
for basic  medical  services on health  care utilization  in  comparable  levels of income, and this decline has
Armenia.  Because of the reduction  in public financing of  occurred among both the poor and the rich, with average
health services  and decentralization  and increased  utilization falling by  12 percent between the two  surveys.
privatization  of health care  provision,  private  out-of-  But families with four or more children,  the largest
pocket contributions are  increasingly  becoming  a  beneficiary group under the "vulnerable  population"
significant component of health  costs in Armenia.  To  program,  have decreased  their use of health care  services
help poor families  cope with this constraint,  the  in a disproportionate  manner-21  percent reduction  in
Armenian  government provided  a free-of-charge  basic  use between  the two survey rounds. This precipitous
package  service  to eligible individuals  in vulnerable  drop in health  care use  by this vulnerable  group,  despite
groups, such as the disabled  and children  from  single  being eligible  for free medical services,  suggests that the
parent households.  Drawing  on the 1996 and 1998-99  program was inadequate  in stemming the decline  in the
Armenia  Integrated  Survey  of Living Standards  (AISLS),  use of health  services.  The authors  further present
which allows the identification  of eligible  individuals  evidence  to suggest that the free-of-charge  eligibility
under this program, the authors estimate the impact of  program  acts more  like an income transfer mechanism,
the fee-waiver  program on utilization  of health services,  particularly  to disabled individuals.
particularly  among the poor. Across  the two survey
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The objective of this paper is to assess the effect of waiver instruments  on health care
utilization. Given the regressive effects of fees in health care utilization,  governments
implement waiver and exemptions to protect specific population groups or assure the delivery
of specific  services (Bitran and Giedion 2002). Waivers in health care are generally intended
to ensure the subsidized service for specific population groups, which could be determined
using a number of criteria - depending on the country -- such as geographic  location,
ethnicity, or even poverty indicators. Exemptions,  on the other hand, intend to guarantee the
free delivery of specific  services that, for instance, entail significant externalities.  In practice,
individuals that are waiver beneficiaries  could also receive exempted services,  such as a
disabled receiving TB care. Armenia,  as many other former Soviet Union countries,  has both
types of interventions. This paper uses the evidence from a targeted waiver program in
Armenia in order to assess its impact on health care utilization among the uncovered.
The rest of the paper is organized  as follows.  Section 2 describes the evolution of the
health care sector during the late nineties and the characteristics of the fee-waiver program in
health care.  Section 3 describes the data used and the caveats in comparison across different
cross sections.  Section 4 discusses the major findings regarding eligibility, morbidity, and
health care utilization between  1996 and 1998/99.  Section 5 presents the utilization model and
discusses the results. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2.  Health sector in Armenia and the fee-waiver  program
This section describes the evolution of the health sector during the nineties and the
implications in terms of access to health care, especially among the poor and other vulnerable
populations.  The transition process in Armenia involved the health sector in at least two
dimensions. First, the overall decrease in public expenditures  in health care during the early
nineties affected the number of personnel, quality of services and the maintenance of the
existing infrastructure. Even though the fall of real spending in social areas after
independence  was reversed in the late nineties, important effects on the supply quality of
health services and on the demand for health care were observed. The declining quality of
services associated with lower wages, lack of drugs and deteriorated infrastructure was
accompanied by a significant decline in the number of patients  and increased informal
payments.
A second dimension is the market-oriented reform in the health sector, which involved
a decentralization  process and privatizations of some components of the system. Hospitals and
polyclinics were converted into semi-private enterprises and the management of health care
providers was decentralized  allowing them to fix their health service prices,  choose their mix
between medical and administrative personnel, and allocate resources accordingly.  In 1993
state health care institutions became state health enterprises, or semi-independent units that
could generate their own revenues parallel  to state budget financing. In 1995 hospitals  and
polyclinics were permitted to provide private services in addition to state funded ones,
1providing them additional autonomy with self-decision on staffing (World Bank 2002a). The
separation between health care delivery and financing was established through the creation of
the State Health Agency (SHA) in 1998, responsible for purchasing services to providers
(hospitals).'  In order to contract out services a Basic Benefit Package was established.
The changes during the nineties represented the actual elimination of former free
universal health care coverage  since those allowed providers to generate their own revenues
through OOP. As a result, the increased incidence of out-of-pocket expenditures -- and even
worse, that of informal payments to medical  and administrative  stafY2  -- resulted in decreased
health care utilization, especially among the poor. To respond, the government established a
program that provided free of charge medical services based on two eligibility conditions: (i)
the patient belongs to some vulnerable socio-economic categories; or (ii) the medical care is
qualified as "urgent" by the medical staff.3 The definition of the vulnerable groups  actually
corresponded to the system of categorical  social assistance benefits inherited from the former
Soviet Union. All costs of services (not including medications) under the program for the
"Vulnerable Population" are covered by the government and expected not to exceed 30
percent of the provider's total annual budget. All other interventions are expected to be cover
by the resources  generated by the providers.
The eligibility to the vulnerable  population  program
The primary focus of this study is to examine the effect of a fee-waiver program on
health care utilization in Armenia. Vulnerable population groups were officially defined as
those disabled persons (according to three degrees of disability), war veterans,  children under
the age of 18 with one parent, orphans under the age of 18, disabled children under the age of
16, families with four or more children under the age of 18,  families of war victims, prisoners,
children of disabled parents, victims of the Chemobyl disaster, and catastrophe workers.
This paper uses the Armenia Integrated Survey of Living Standards (ISLS)  for 1996
and 1998/99 in order to explore for factors that shape the demand for health care during this
period of economic transition. In both surveys the eligibility criteria was expressed as
belonging to one of the following five categories:  (Cl) disabled; (C2) orphan;  (C3) families
with four or more children under the age of eighteen; (C4) children under the age of eighteen
with one parent; and (C5) children of disabled parents.  These criteria result from specific
questions since the survey was designed to support the social assistance system and needed to
precisely identify those individuals.
' Besides the increased responsibility of the provider's managerial team, the decentralization  also increased
the political dependence to the local authorities, such as the opinion of the local governor (marzpet).
2About 91 percent of patients reported mnaking informal payments in Armenia, the highest incidence
among the countries surveyed in the Europe and Central Asia region (Lewis 2000).
3 Anecdotal  evidence  suggested  that  the  subjective  qualification  of "urgency"  affected  the  incidence  of
health care  interventions  and subsidies, providing  free services  to those not in urgency  nor in vulnerable groups
(Kurchiyan  1999; World Bank 2000).
23. Data sources and eligibility  criteria
This study uses two household surveys  from Armenia - the 1996 Armenia Living
Standard Survey and the 1998/99 Armenia Integrated Survey of Living Standards (AISLS).
The  1996 survey was conducted during November and December of 1996 with a sample size
of 20,076 individuals  and was nationally representative.  The 1998/99 AISLS was carried out
throughout  a full year (July 1998 to June 1999) with a sample size of 15,632 individuals and
covering all regions.
The two surveys are separate cross-sections,  i.e., households/individuals  cannot be
tracked over time. The eligibility program that we focus upon in this study was already being
phased in by late 1996/early  1997, and the eligibility program did not change substantially
between November/December  1996 and July  1998/June  1999. Thus, we lack the base-line
data to conduct a "before and after" program evaluation.  However, given that program
eligibility is exogenous, we can still examine the impact of the program on the two cross-
sections (the eligibility program will the discussed more in details later on in this section).
Also, while there were changes in the survey instrument between the two rounds, the
morbidity module and the module from which we infer program eligibility, are consistent
across the two rounds. Before examining health related issues, a discussion about the
comparability of the two surveys is provided next.
Comparability  of the two cross sections
A recent analysis of  Real Private Consumption Armenia 1995-1999
poverty discussed the
difficulties in comparing  240
poverty between  two surveys  220
in Armenia since the surveys  >  200 -
differ in their sample design,  180  s
survey period and  160
questionnaire  format (World  _14
Bank 2002a). For exarnple,  a
the measurement of poverty  120
indicators  is affected by the  100
differences  in the timing of  80  3  1  3  I  3  . 3
the two surveys due to  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999
seasonality in consumption
and the problems to construct comparable consumption aggregates.4 The 1996 survey was
conducted in the last quarter of 1996, coinciding with the peak of the consumption profile (see
graph), compared to the 1998/99 AISLS.
4 The 1996 Survey asked only about expenditures, not consumption during the month previous to the
survey date. Moreover,  information on expenditures  for  1996 was not collected using the same questionnaire  for
all households.  Some households responded to a more aggregate expenditure  questionnaire,  than others.
International evidence indicates  that this type of differences  in questionnaire design leads to sigmficant
3To address the comparability problem, the mentioned report provided a limited
comparison between the two Surveys under a number of restrictions. First, poverty indicators
for 1998 were estimated only on information collected  during the fourth quarter (October-
November).  Second, the  1996 poverty line with proper inflation adjustment was used, hence
avoiding changes in the poverty line due to changes in its structure.5
These comparability problems also affect the analysis of this paper despite the
identical health module because of the strong seasonality in morbidity observed in Armenia.
The Armenian epidemiological  profile indicates that respiratory diseases represent about half
of the first diagnosis in Armenia (Ministry of Health 2000) despite the fact that mortality due
to respiratory diseases has been declining and is only 5 percent of the total mortality.6 To
avoid seasonality in health status and health care measures,  the paper mainly examines the
1996 survey and the corresponding  fourth quarter for 1998  (evidence  for the full 1998/99
survey is also provided).
4.  Major changes An  eflig&blity,  morbidity and ufflization
This section describes the evolution of program eligibility (the crucial variable to
identify the impact of the program), morbidity, utilization  and expenditures.
Changes in eligibility.
In 1996,  14 percent of individuals were classified as eligible; in November-December
1998 (henceforth referred to as ND98)  15 percent of individuals were classified as eligible;
and in the full 1998/99,  almost 17 percent of individuals were classified  as eligible. The
almost negligible change in the fraction eligible between  1996 and the comparable  period in
1998 confirms the quality of the survey since there were no significant changes in the
eligibility to the fee-waiver program during the period. Even though the eligibility criteria are
not explicitly poverty targeted, those socioeconomic criteria have strong correlations with
poverty. The evidence on eligibility by consumption quintiles confirms this since the poor
were more likely to be classified as eligible in both surveys (see IFRgure  1).  Given a similar
eligibility income gradient,  what are the patterns in health care utilization?
differences  in consumption estimates between the two sub-samples  and raises serious questions  about their
comparability (Olson and Lanjouw 2001). The  1998/99 AISLS on the other hand, collected information on both
consumption and expenditures using the same format for all households.
5 An additional adjustment was that instead of using per adult equivalent consumption  (used for 1998/99),
the corparison  uses per capita consumption similar to that used m  1996.
6 Other chronic diseases-such  as cardiovascular,  neurological, neoplasm, and kidney illnesses-represent
a relatively small fraction of the first health care contacts.  Cardiovascular diseases, however,  represent 35
percent of the mortality for the population aged 0 to 64 m 1999. The incidence of infectious and parasitic
diseases  is less than 8 percent of cases, but evidenced a significant increase during the nineties (Ministry of
Health 2000).
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Changes in morbidity  profiles and health care utilization
Both surveys contain informnation about self-reported morbidity. Individuals report
whether they experience an illness within the last 30 days (preceding the survey). Self-
reported morbidity measures tend to be associated with education, income and access to
health care providers (Strauss and Thomas 1996),  and in consequence better-off individuals
tend to be more likely to report themselves  as sick. However, while this relationship  is linear
in the first round, we observe a U-shaped relationship in the second round (i.e., the poorest
and the richest individuals are more likely to report an illness - see Figure 2).  We also find a
small reduction in morbidity rates between the two samples:  average morbidity in 1996 was
18.7 percent, while average morbidity in 1998/99 was  17.2 percent (average morbidity in
ND98 was 14.5%).7  Self-Reported morbidity rates tend to be higher for Eligible individuals
compared to their non-eligible counterparts (see Figures 3  and 4).
While health care utilization (conditional upon being sick) tended to increase with
wealth in the 1996 survey, the (simple graphical)  relationship between utilization and wealth
is not so clear-cut in the 1998/99 AISLS (see Figures 5 and 6).  There was however, a
significant reduction in health care utilization between the two survey rounds. Average
utilization rate in 1996 was 50 percent, while the average utilization rate in 1998/99 was 36.6
percent (average utilization rate in ND98 was 36.8%).
7  This paper does not attempt to explain the slight reduction in self-reported morbidity, although some
evidence from the U.S.  and Indonesia points that self-reported morbidity is affected by the price of health care
observed in the locality (see Dow and others  1997).
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Which socioeconomic  groups experienced largest declines in health care utilization
(conditional on being sick)? Reduction in utilization was however, most pronounced among
the rich (see Figure 7), and that effect was amplified among rich eligible individuals  (see
Figure 8).8 If anything, in general,  health care utilization by the poor seems to have increased.
However, health care utilization rates fell for all eligible categories9 across the two rounds
(see Table  1). While the reduction in health care utilization by the disabled (-13%) was
similar in magnitude to average reduction in the sample (-12%), utilization by individuals
8 If the full 1998/99 AISLS is used to estimate this decline,  a smaller drop is found because of the higher
utilization durng the winter period that was not captured by the  1996 survey.
9 Orphans are left out due to extremely small sample size.
7coming from families with four or more children (under  18)  fell by 21 percent, despite the fact
that this group was covered under the BBP prograin. We shall further explore this issue within
a multivariate regression  framework later on in this paper.
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8Table 1: Health care utilization by eligibility category  in 1996 and 1998/99
Utilization  (%)  Utilization (%)
1996  1998/99
Disabled  59.4  47.3
(N=276)  (N=279)
Belong to a Family  with  -4 children  48.5  27.6
(N=1  14)  (N=199)
Childfrom a single-parent  HH  41.2  33.3
(N--1 7)  (N=24)
Child  with a disabled  parent  47  39.4
(N=100)  (N=66)
Service providers
Despite the significant decline in health care utilization, the decomposition of
utilization by providers shows few changes between  1996 and 1998/99, even across quintiles.
During both survey rounds, among the sick that sought health care, the majority of the visits
were to polyclinics and hospitals (see Figures 9 and 10). For comparable facilities across the
survey rounds (i.e., polyclinics, hospitals and diagnostic  centers), only hospital visitations
exhibit any systematic relationship with income (see Figures 11  and 12).
Overall, the proportion that sought health care in polyclinics experienced a small
decline  from 52 to 49 percent between  1996 and 1998/99.10  This is consistent with the larger
decline in Primary Health care utilization rates compared to Hospital utilization (World Bank
2002b).  The poor are more likely to seek care in polyclinics (more than 60 percent).  The
fraction of users going into polyclinics decreases among the better-off households probably
reflecting poorer quality of health care and access to other facilities (hospitals). Hospital care,
on the other hand, represented about 28 percent of those seeking health care in both years, and
the rich were more likely to go there than the poor in both years (38 and 36 percent for 1996
and  1998/99).
One of the few changes in utilization was the increase in Other sources of care. In
1996 Other (non specified) sources represented only 7 percent of those seeking care. In
1998/99 about 10 percent of patients went to other sources,  including private doctors
(particularly among the better off households).
'° The  share of Primary health care utilization in 1996 could be even larger is those covered by health posts
(fyelcher) are mcluded. In total, polyclinics  and  yelchers represented 57 percent of health care according to the
1996 AILS.
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Out-of-pocket payments and waivers
The fees charged to patients and the ability to waive those costs may affect the
decision to choose some providers.  About 64 percent of the patients paid for health care in
Armenia (Table 2). The poor are less likely to pay for health care (about 40 percent) and
chances of paying are even lower in polyclinics (34 percent). This may reflect the effects of
the free-of-charge Basic Benefit Package. The BBP, despite of not being poverty targeted,
may have covered the individuals  with lower consumption if the vulnerable categories are
associated with poverty.  On the other hand, a better off individual could also have used the
BBP to obtain free-of-charge  health services if she were eligible (either vulnerable category or
urgency).  As the BBP covers only basic services,  individuals were likely to be subject to other
payments, mainly through informal mechanisms.
Table 2: Percent of patients that paid for services
(Percent)
Quintiles  Polyclinic  Diagnostic  Hospital  Private  Other  Total
Center  Doctor
1  34.0  75.0  44.4  80.0  33.3  39.4
2  50.4  18.2  68.3  64.3  40.0  52.5
3  58.5  71.4  66.7  100.0  14.3  59.6
4  75.8  100.0  77.4  76.2  40.0  76.1
5  69.7  100.0  87.5  69.0  6.7  75.3
Total  59.9  75.5  74.8  74.4  23.1  64.1
Polyclinics  are the cheapest alternative for most patients. A sick individual from the
poorest quintiles pays about 1,300 drains compared to 4,000 in a diagnostic center or 3,400 in
a hospital. The expected  cost (the cost weighed by the probability of being charged) is lower
11in hospitals than in diagnostic centers or private doctors, explaining the choice of polyclinics
and hospitals over other altematives (TabBe 3).
11ablie 3: Average  cost for Patients that paidl for services
(dramns)
Quintiles  IPoRyclinic  Clengn@ster  HlospitaR  IFrivate IlDoctor  Other  Total
1  1,320  4,000  3,421  2,625  3,000  2,224
2  1,809  5,000  3,918  4,241  2,250  2,666
3  1,883  6,200  4,125  2,711  625  2,698
4  3,462  8,333  10,386  2,913  2,000  5,496
5  5,388  39,031  45,702  10,538  10,000  25,099
Total  3,384  24,937  26,027  5,697  2,646  12,175
The lower utilization and the choice of cheapest providers results in a regressive
incidence of private expenditures.  The poorest population quintile spends less than 2 percent
of the private health care expenditures in Armenia. The richest quintile is responsible  for
almost 80 percent of the private expenditures. Inequality in private health expenditures,
however,  is not necessarily negative,  since government intervention could be covering those
poorest individuals. However,  the BBP that is freely provided to some vulnerable groups does
not cover drugs and pharmaceuticals.  Share of expenditures in drugs represent about 20
percent for the overall population, but is almost 40 among the poorest quintiles (see Table 4).
Table 4:  D]istribntionm of private health expendtoures
(Annenia  1998/99)
Share of totaW  private expenditures by quintule (%)  Conmcenmtration
E8ealth itemn
I  2  3  4  0  index
Dental  0.0  5.3  5.1  13.2  76.4  0.718
Diagnostic  2.1  1.2  6.7  14.8  75.2  0.675
Treatment  1.4  2.8  2.8  9.0  83.9  0.755
Other  0.5  1.3  6.6  6.8  84.7  0.777
Drugs  3.0  7.3  11.8  20.5  57.4  0.512
Total  1.7  3.7  4.9  11.6  78.0  0.703
Memo item:  Total
- Percent spent on drugs  36.5  39.6  48.1  35.6  14.9  20.2
- Private expenditures  222.3  492.5  652.2  1,532.8  10,298.7  13,198.4
(in thousands drarns)
Source: ILCS  1998/99.  Note: The table shows  the sarple.
What share of the government expenditure  in health care is being captured by the
poor? Individuals in the poorest quintile benefit only from 13 percent of total expenditures,
compared to those in the richest quintile that capture almost 40 percent of the public resources
12(see Table 5). Even though the individuals in the poorest quintiles  are more likely to choose
polyclinics as their major health care provider, most of the patients in the polyclinics are from
the better-off households.  This pattern is due to the differences in health care utilization across
socioeconomic  households,  since individuals from better off households are more likely to
seek health care once they are sick. In 1999,  the government spent about 5 billion drains in
polyclinics.  Patients from the poorest quintile captured only 772 million compared to those in
the richest quintiles that captured about twice that amount (1.4 billion). However,  across
different govermment health facilities, polyclinics represent the least regressive alternative.
The concentration index for polyclinics (0.114) is less than one half than that of hospitals and
other centers (0.276). Coincidentally, health care utilization in the poorest quintile (25.9
percent) is almost half of that of the richest (51.4 percent).
Table 5: Distribution of public expenditures in health (excluding  private expenditures)
(mnllion drams)
Received by quintfle  Total  Concentration
1  2  3  4  5  budget  index
Polyclinic  772.3  892.3  884.8  989.8  1,409.7  4,949.0  0.114
Diagnostic Center  190.7  524.5  333.8  286.1  1,001.4  2,336.5  0.276
Hospital  1,687.7  1,537.7  1,687.7  2,325.3  5,400.7  12,639.1  0.276
Total  2,650.8  2,954.5  2,906.3  3,601.2  7,811.8  19,924.6  0.236
Despite the regressive pattern of overall spending in the health sector, there is some
evidence of a progressive pattern of public spending regarding the provision of the targeted
program for the vulnerable.  Evidence from the budget allocations during 1999 indicates that
the allocation of free-of-charge  services targeted to the vulnerable population has been
positively associated with poverty incidence across regions (marz) in Armenia.
It should be noted that despite being eligible to free-of-charge  care, individuals are
required to contribute  informal payments, posing an additional burden both to the poor and
non-poor. This stems from
the fact that providers are  Poverty and Free Health Care Expenditures
not being paid the entire  80  --
cost of their expenses  for  7
their coverage of vulnerable  7
groups, forcing them to  60
cross-subsidize by charging  -
higher fees to patients with  DU50
higher incomes or directly G40)
charging (via informal
methods) the eligible  30
population (European  20
Observatory 2001).  20
ln(Health  Expenditures)
13Self-reported health status and eligibility categories
While we find that health care utilization rates have declined between the two surveys,
we do not have information on how this decline in utilization has actually effected adult or
child health outcomes. We do, however, have information on self-reported health status.
Respondents  in both surveys were asked to rate their overall health status as "very well",
"good", "normal", "not so good", or "bad". The use of this type of self-reported health status
(often referred to as the Likert scale) has been shown to be a powerful predictor of subsequent
of morbidity and mortality (Idler and Benjamini  1997). Our interest in this variable arises not
as a predictor of future mortality, however, as a possible proxy for an individual's health
status, and to examine how this self-reported measure has changed between the two surveys.
Self-reported health status (SRHS) using the same five-point scale was collected in
both rounds. We only draw upon the SRHS of adults for our analysis. In the 1996 survey, for
75 percent of the respondents, information on SRHS is missing, thus,  1996 results
incorporating this additional information is not necessary comparable to results using the full
adult sample. Given that caveat, comparisons of average  SRHS across the two rounds do not
indicate a decline in self-reported  health status. Comparing sample averages, in both rounds,
self-reported health of eligible individuals were worse than that of non-eligible, self-reported
health of women were worse than that of men, self-reported health of urban residents were
worse than that of rural residents, and the self-reported health of the poor was worse
compared to the rich. Table 6, for example reports the distribution of SRHS responses by
eligibility.  In both rounds,  a disproportionate number of eligible individuals  classify
themselves as being in "bad" health.
Table 6: IDLstiributon  of seRf-reported  heaRth  statu2s
(Percent)
Bad  Not so good  Normal  Good  Very well
Eligible 96  16.02  15.59  37.63  26.75  4.01
Non-Eligible 96  8.66  21.25  40.62  25.5  3.97
Eligible 98/99  11.39  15.66  48.36  22.47  2.12
Non-Eligible  98/99  5.3  17.04  54.13  20.82  2.71
For all subsequent presentation,  we will decompose eligibility into its separate
components given that we had previously noted that utilization rates and changes in usage
differed according to the eligibility category. As we see in Appeimsdl  Table Al, families with
four or more children, is the largest eligible group in the sample.  In Tlalble  IRI  and TablRe R2,
we present an ordered probit specification of the correlates of self-reported health status for
the adult sample. Most studies in this literature find a negative association between SRHS and
age and being female, and a positive association between SRHS and wealth (Case and Deaton
2002). Results from the  1996 round, indicate that SRHS in negatively associated with age,
14gender and urban residence (there  are also strong district effects), however,  insignificant
wealth effects. Results from the  1998/99 round are more in line with other finding in this
literature - besides been negatively associated with age, being female and urban residence,
SRHS  is also positively associated with wealth.
While only disability is significant (negative)  is the 1996 specification,  both disability
(negative)  and belonging to a family with four or more children (positive)  is significant  in the
1998/99 specification.  It should not come as a surprise that people classified as disabled
would report themselves as being in poor health. The interpretation on the non-disability
based category is not so intuitive. Families with four or more children tend to be poorer (even
in non per-capita terms), poorer individuals tend to underreport morbidity spells and seek less
health care. Health care usage in turn, can affect self-reported  health status. Given that people
who use the health care system are more likely to be better informed than non-users, in
situations where  lower-income individuals  are less likely to use health care, the measurement
error in SRHS will be amplified and systematically related to income (Strauss and Thomas
1998). Thus, we present results with and without including this variable given that we realize
that by trying to compensate  for our lack of information about innate healthiness, we might in
turn introduce a systematic  source of measurement  error.
5.  The Model of Demand  for Health Care and Results
We first model the reduced form demand for health care (Grossmann  1972) as a
function of program eligibility and individual, household and regional characteristics.  Ideally,
besides controlling for latent health status, we should also control for more detailed
community infrastructure  factors, and prices of medical services for particular services. We
however, do not have such information available for this study"  l.  In addition, the (exogenous)
program eligibility indicator is included. We can express the structural equation underlying
the observed behavior as:
P,* = A, E,  +a 7, +B':H, + O,Rj + 6i(1
where  Pi  is the  individual's  net benefit  from  seeking  health  care,  E,  is a binary  indicator
variable which  takes on the value of 1 if the  individual is  eligible  for subsidized/free  health
care, I, is a vector of own characteristics,  Hi is a vector of households  characteristics,  R, is a
vector of regional characteristics,  and  Ci is a normally-distributed  error term with mean zero
and  variance  or.  We  don't  observe  the  latent  variable  P,*.  We  see  only  the  results  of the
individual's evaluation  of (2), which is manifest in the choice made by the individual  to seek
health care or not to seek health care:
Pi =1 ifWP  > O  (2a)
l  We do have prices paid for medical consultation, however,  given that the illness  is not specified,  and we
are not modelmg for any specific  spells of illness, we do not include that mfornation in this study.
15P1 = 0 ifP,￿<o  (2b)
We estimate (2a-b) as a probit model,1 2 correcting for unspecified heteroskedasticity.
The assumption that the error term is iid, is a rather strong one, given that we are not
controlling for the unobserved (to the researcher) healthiness of the individual. As previously
mentioned we present results both with and without inclusion of SRHS, which we attempt to
use and a proxy for unobserved health status.
The dependent variable is "Sought Health Care if Sick" that on the value of one if the
individual sought health care if sick (zero otherwise). The key eligibility variables for the
analysis are a set of categorical dummies that take value of one when the individual belongs
to one of the eligible categories  (disabled, belong to a family with 4 or more children, child
from a single parent household, child with a disabled parent).1 3
Other control variables include:  household income quintile indicators1 4 (the poorest
quintile, Ql, is omitted); age group dummies (above 61 is the left out category in the adult
specification;  age 6-10 is the left out category in the child specification); Gender (takes on the
value of 1 if the individual is female); Level of Education (primary level is the omitted
categories); education of household head (which is only included in the 1998/99 child
specification  given that this information is missing in the 1996 survey);  Urban-rural indicators
and regional (Marz) dummies; and month Fixed-Effects (included only in the 1998/99
specification).
To examine the robustness of the results, the estimation of health care utilization is
implemented on the adult sample only and the children sample separately.  In Armenia, as well
as many other former Soviet Union countries, a system of waivers and exemptions is present.
Children under 18 years of age also qualify to receive medical care under a separate program
targeted to this specific age group.  To avoid confounding the effects of the waiver program
from those of the child-targeted program,  separate analyses are carried out. Since other
programs already cover children, the fee-waiver program should not bind and hence have a
smaller or negligible effect.
Besides estimating the utilization model, for the adult sample we also estimate  a
multinomial choice model of health care provider.  We are particularly interested in what
shapes the decision of individuals to seek health care in polyclinics and hospitals, the primary
providers.  The dependent variable in the multinomial specification is composed of six health
care provider categories in both 1996 and 1998/99. In the 1996 specification those are (%
number in parenthesis represent share of visits): Diagnostic Center (4.27%), Polyclinic
12 Logit results are almost identical.
13 As separate regressions  are estimated for adults and children, these categorical dummies are mutually
exclusive  in each regression. Disabled  and belong to a family with 4 or more children, appear in the adult
regression specification.  In the children's regression, childfrom a single  parent  household, and child with a
disabled  parent  are also included.
14 Consumption based measure of income - without incorporating health expenditures
16(24.72%), Hospital (15.36%), Fyelcher (2.15%)'5,  Other (4.2%)16,  and no health care
(49.30%)which is selected as the comparison  group. In the 1998/99 specification the choices
are relatively similar:  Diagnostic Center (1.88%),  Polyclinic (21.55%), Hospital (12.50%),
Private Provider (3.03%), Other (1.56%),  and no health care (59.47%) which is selected as the
comparison group.
Regression results' 7
We present regression results for two sub-samples: adults (age>=l 8) and children
between ages 6 through 17).18 We also ran the regressions without including household
income quintiles, given that health and income  are potentially simultaneously determined.
Exclusion of income did not have any bearing on any of  the salient findings in this analysis
(results not reported).
As we see in Table R3, girls are 10 percent less likely to seek health care when sick
compared to boys. Besides a weak urban effect, nothing else was significant in explaining the
variation in utilization rates. In the adult specification, disabled individuals are  11 percent
more likely to seek health care; less likely to do so if female (albeit at a 10% level of
significance); health care usage increases with education and wealth; urban denizens are more
likely to seek health care compared to their rural counterparts; and, there are strong district
effects  (Column 1, Table R4). We present results after inclusion of SRHS in Column 2 of
Table R4, however, we do not give much credence to those results given information on
SRHS is missing for most of the sample.
Unlike 1996 results, we no longer find any significant negative bias against girls in
1998/99 (Table R5), while on the other hand we now find that adult females are more likely
to use health care (albeit significant at the 10% level - see Table R6). Disability is the only
significant eligibility criterion in the child specification,  and is robust to inclusion of SRHS.
Education of household head is weakly significant, while seasonal  and regional factors appear
to be important determinants of health care utilization. In the adult specification without
inclusion of SRHS, both disability and large family size are significant,  albeit in opposite
directions.  Inclusion of SRHS somewhat weakens  the significance of family size, however,
the results still hold that suggest utilization decreases with family size and increases with
disability. Wealth, education and seasonal factors also arise as significant determinants of
adult health care usage.
15 Health posts that may be reported as Diagnostic Centers or Polyclinics  in 1998/99.
16 Unspecified  health care provider - there was no information on private providers in the  1996 survey.
17 Variable  mteractions were included in both the probit and the multinomial logistic specifications  (e.g.,
eligibility interacted  with income), however,  none of the interaction terms were significant in any of the adult or
child specifications for (results not reported).
18 We do not present regression results  for children aged 5 and under. Besides seasonal and regional factors,
nothing is significant in explaining differences  in utilization rates.  This reflects the existence of auxiliary health
care programs/exemptions  for children, and suggests that there is considerable regional variation in these
programns.
17Did the program work ?
The primary goal of this study was to help answer one fundamental question - did the
program for the vulnerable population increase health care utilization in Armenia? Well, the
answer primary hinges upon temporal and category factors,  and first of all lets rephrase the
question - was the program well targeted? In Tlables 7 amd $, we present t-test results of
whether or not there was a significant difference in mean reporting of illness, income, and
self-reported health status across these groups. In 1998/99, disabled individuals were both
more likely to be sick and more likely to be poorer.  Hence, we can say that in 1998/99 the
program was appropriately targeted to the disabled, health care utilization was positively
associated with disability, thus, there was a progressive  income transfer to the disabled.  In
1996, disabled were more likely to be sick, however, were not more likely to be poorer. As
pointed out earlier, it is difficult to compare incomes across the two surveys, and anyway, it
appears that targeting improved over time regarding the disabled. Results from the
multinomial regressions of provider choice in both survey rounds indicate that the disabled
were more likely to seek health care in Diagnostic Centers and Hospitals (see Tables IR7 and
1O8).  Belonging to a family with four or more children,  was not significant in explaining any
of the provider choice (These findings were robust to inclusion of self-reported health status -
results not reported).
On the other hand, in 1998/99, even though families with four or more children were
appropriately targeted, they were still less likely to utilize the health care system - when we
did not observe the latter phenomenon  (i.e., significantly less health care utilization) in 1996.
We need more detailed institution and household level information to find out why this group
is opting out of the health care system (e.g.,  are informal payments higher for some groups? is
that in tum due to the fact that it is easier for the health facility to get reimbursed for some
groups relative to others?).
TablRe 7: 1996 T-test compnairmns
More likely to self-report More likely have  More likely to have
yourself as sick ?  less income ?  lower SRIIS ?
(full sanple)  (full sample)  (adult sample)
Disabled  nES  _  s  ',_
Families with 4 or more  NO  _  __  ns
Children under  18
Children under  18 from a  s  ns
Single Parent Household
Children under 18 with a  s  ns
Disabled  Parent
Note: YES,  NO - represents  statistically  significant  differences; ns - difference is not significant; t both in
per-capita  and non per-capita  consumption and  income terms
18Table 8: 1998/99 T-test comparHsoims
More likely to self-report  More likely to have  More likely to have
yourself as sick ?  less income  ?  lower SIRiHS ?
_________________(full  saniple)  (full  sample  (adult sample)
Disabled  YES  YLES
Families with 4 or more  NO  y_s__  ,r  |  ES
Children under  18
Children under  18 from a  Ns  YESl
Single Parent Household
Children under  18 with a  NC
lDisabled Parent
Note:  YES,  NO - represents statistically significant differences ;  ns - difference is not significant;  * both in
per-capita  and non per-capita consumption and income terms
6.  concl1usDon
The primary goal of the program for the vulnerable population -- which allowed
certain vulnerable  groups to seek 'free of charge'  medical services--  was to mitigate against
the decrease in health care utilization,  particularly among the poor. Unfortunately,  utilization
rates have continued to fall - for both the poor and the rich. Despite comparable  income
levels, average  utilization fell by 12 percent between the two surveys. This was most probably
due to a confluence of factors  - increase in formal user fees,  increases in informal payments,
and decline in quality of service delivery. Families with four or more children, the largest
beneficiary  group under the program, have decreased  their usage of health care services in a
disproportionate  manner - 21  percent reduction in usage between the two survey rounds.  This
precipitous  drop in health care usage by this vulnerable  group despite being eligible for free
medical  services, suggests that the program just by itself was inadequate in stemming the
decline in the usage of health services.  The  evidence suggests that this program worked  as an
income transfer mechanism for the disabled and that a more credible budget reimbursement
process is needed to ensure any impact among the poor (who may more price sensitive).
There is no way of saying that would have happened  to utilization rates among these
groups if the program had not been in place. What we can say is that despite been poor, the
fall in utilization rates among the disabled was similar to the sample average,  and it is likely
that this program helped to mitigate against  fu-ther slippage in utilization rates among the
disabled.  There are suggestions  (without empirical scrutiny) that recent policy changes in
Armenia may actually have improved access to health care among the poor due to the
expansion of the eligibility criteria.  In 1999 the Government of Armenia implemented a major
reform in their Social Assistance system moving from the categorical benefits as examined in
this paper, to a poverty-targeted  (means-tested)  benefit program allocated  at the household
level (Poverty Family Benefit, PFB). The health sector in 2001  decided to include the PFB
19expansion was accompanied by increased information about its use, proper institutional
design that attenuates the incentive for informal payments, and improved quality standards,
then coverage of the poor might actually have improved. This, however, remains as an
unanswered empirical question.19
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20Appendix Tables
Table Al: Composition  of eligibility categories
(Percent)
1996  1998/99
Sample  Eligible  Sample  Eligible
Disabled  2.43  17.4  3.81  22.73
Belong to a Family  8.92  62.85  9.77  57.36
with >=4 Children
Child from a Single  0.57  3.6  0.94  5.11
Parent HH
Child with a Disabled  2.90  15.72  2.89  14.47
Parent
Orphan  0.06  0.43  0.04  0.23
Table A2:  Comparison of surveys  1996 and 1998/99
1996  1998/99
Sample size  4,260 households  3,600 households
Field work  *  2 months: November-  *  12 months: July 1998- June
December  1996  1999
*  No significant inflation  *  Inflation adjustment
during the period.  needed: Food = 7%;
energy and telephone
prices = 20%.
Major policy changes  None  *  Elimination of energy
subsidies.
*  Changes in social assistance
programs
Expenditure  *  75% of the sample  *  All households completed a
information  responded aggregate  diary with detailed
monthly expenditures  expenditures during the
during the last 30 days  last 30 days.
*  25%  filled a detailed diary  *  All households  completed a
on expenditures during the  section on Annual
last 30 days.  Consumption for a very
limited list of items.









Belong to a Family  0.024
With >W4 Children  (0.33)
Other Individual  Characteristics
Age 29-39  -0.323
(6.04)**
Age 40-50  -0.590
(10.56)**
Age  51-61  -0.937
(14.78)*"























F-Test  for Joint  Significance
Income Quartiles[X2(4)]  5.23
Age Categories[x 2(4)]  406.91*0
Education Categories[X2(3)]  3.83
District Fixed-Effects[X2(10)]  64.9**
(not reported)
Robust z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at  1%.
Note: Coefficients  are marginal probabilities.
22Table R2: Armenia 1998/99 Adult (>=18)  Sample
Ordered Probit Regression
Dependent Variable
Self-Reported  Health Status





Belong to a Family  0.162
With >=4 Children  (3.67)**
Other  Individual Characteristics
Age 29-39  -0.416
(13.47)**
Age 40-50  -0.714
(22.09)**
Age 51-61  -0.955
(23.77)**














































F-Testfor Joint  Significance
Income Quartiles[x2(4)]  43.6700
Age Categories[x2(4)]  1290"
Education Categories[x2(3)]  14.10"
Month Fixed-Effects[x 2(1 1)]  17.45A
District Fixed-Effects[X2(10)]  148.4100
(not reported)
Robust z statistics in parentheses
A significance  at 10%; * significant at 5%;  "  significant at 1%.
Note: Coefficients  are marginal probabilities.
24Table R3: Armenia 1996 Children (>5 & <18) Sample
Probit Regressions
Dependent Variable





Belong to a Family  -0.061
With >=4 Children  (0.89)
Child from a  0.082
Single Parent HH  (0.55)
Child with a  -0.081
Disabled Parent  (1.05)
Other  Individual Characteristics
Age  11-14  -0.076
(1.55)





















F-Test  for Joint  Significance
Income Quartiles[x2(4)]  4.0
Age Categories[X2(2))  3.61
Education Categories[X2(3)]  1.25
District Fixed-Effects[X2(10)]  11.85
(not reported)
Robust z statistics in parentheses
A significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
Note: Coefficients  are marginal probabilities.
25Table R4: Armenia 1996 Adult (>=18) Sample
Probit Regressions
Dependent Variable




Disabled  0.114  0.017
(3.43)-*  (0.31)
Belong to a Family  0.012  0.072
With >=4 Children  (0.26)  (0.83)
Other Individual Characteristics
Health Status  -0.117
(5.23)**
Age 29-39  -0.036  -0.061
(0.94)  (0.89)
Age 40-50  -0.014  -0.158
(0.38)  (2.43)*
Age 51-61  0.003  -0.104
(0.08)  (1.56)
Age >61  -0.021  -0.096
(0.59)  (1.47)
Female  -0.035  -0.054
(1.72)^  (1.53)
Secondary  0.063  0.148
(1.97)*  (2.56)*
Special-Secondary  0.066  0.076
(1.86)^  (1.20)
Post-Secondary  0.089  0.204
(2.33)*  (3.10)t*
Household  Characteristics
Q2  -0.024  -0.006
(0.73)  (0.11)
Q3  0.060  0.077
(1.82)^  (1.39)
Q4  0.113  0.195
(3.55)4*  (3.55)**
Rich  0.138  0.158
(4.42)**  (2.94)**
Community Characteristics
Urban  0.114  0.084
(4.15)**  (1.54)
Observations  2684  930
F-  Testfor Joint  Sign ificance
Income Quartiles[x2(4)]  39.06**  20.91**
Age Categories[X2(4)]  1.78  6.70
Education Categories[X2(3)]  5.71  12.96**
District Fixed-Effects[X2(10)]  40.68**  29.74**
(not reported)
Robust z statistics in parentheses
Asignificant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
Note: Coefficients  are marginal probabilities.
26Table R5: Armenia 1998/99  Children (>5 & <18) Sample
Probit Regressions
Dependent Variable




Disabled  0.561  0.302
(4.30)**  (2.04)*
Belong to a Family  0.068  0.038
With >=4 children  (0.77)  (0.43)
Child from a  0.046  0.056
Single Parent HH  (0.41)  (0.46)
Child with a  -0.100  -0.108
Disabled Parent  (1.14)  (1.23)
Other Individual  Characteristics
Health Status  -0.161
(4.19)**
Age 11-14  -0.070  -0.094
(1.22)  (1.70)
Age >= 15  -0.061  -0.094
(0.87)  (1.40)
Ferale  -0.043  -0.053
(0.81)  (1.02)
(0.82)
Education of  HH-Head
Secondary  -0.144  -0.150
(1.49)  (1.52)
Special-Secondary  -0.041  -0.036
(0.41)  (0.35)
Post-Secondary  0.024  0.048
(0.21)  (0.41)
Household Wealth
Q2  0.025  0.039
(0.27)  (0.41)
Q3  0.151  0.171
(1.69)  (1.91)
Q4  0.149  0.136
(1.70)  (1.58)
Rich  0.201  0.261
(2.19)*  (2.76)**
Community Characteristics
Urban  0.250  0.244
(3.25)**  (3.02)**
Month Fixed-Effects
August98  0.337  0.398
(1.99)*  (2.32)*
September98  0.002  0.017
(0.02)  (0.12)
27October98  -0.024  -0.032
(0.18)  (0.24)
November98  0.165  0.264
(1.00)  (1.53)
December98  0.224  0.283
(1.48)  (1.86)
January99  -0.157  -0.064
(1.38)  (0.52)
February99  -0.017  0.067
(0.14)  (0.53)
March99  -0.218  -0.187
(1.93)  (1.58)
April99  0.013  0.078
(0.08)  (0.49)
May99  0.160  0.271
(0.89)  (1.47)
June99  0.193  0.193
(1.12)  (1.13)
Observations  389  389
F-Test  for Joint  Significance
Income Quartiles[x2(4)]  7.18  9.77*
Age Categories[X2(2)]  1.67  3.56
Education Categories[X2(3)]  7.424  8.91t
Month Categories [X 2(l 1)]  30.9**  28.8**
District Fixed-Effects[X2(10)]  30.56t*  25.74**
(not reported)
Robust z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
Note: Coefficients  are marginal probabilities.
28Table R6: Armenia 1998/99 Adult (>=18)  Sample
Probit Regressions
Dependent Variable




Disabled  0.123  0.085
(3.56)**  (2.38)
Belong to a Family  -0.108  -0.081
With >=4 children  (2.28)*  (1.65)-
Other Individual Characteristics
Health  Status  -0.081
(5.06)**
Age 29-39  -0.005  -0.041
(0.11)  (0.98)
Age 40-50  -0.019  -0.060
(0.46)  (1.46)
Age 51-61  -0.052  -0.104
(1.24)  (2.46)*
Age >61  -0.008  -0.072
(0.19)  (1.73)-
Female  0.040  0.037
(1.77)-  (1.63)"
Secondary  0.053  0.064
(1.28)  (1.55)
Special-Secondary  0.115  0.135
(2.45)*  (2.87)**
Post-Secondary  0.176  0.201
(3.48)**  (3.98)**
Household-  Wealth
Q2  0.024  0.029
(0.66)  0.79)
Q3  0.120  0.125
(3.24)**  3.36)**
Q4  0.087  0.091
(2.35)*  2.46)*
Rich  0.096  0.109
(2.74)**  3.07)**
Community Characteristics
Urban  0.040  .037
(1.30)  1.20)
Month Fixed-Effects
August98  0.008  0.007
(0.15)  0.13)
September98  0.039  0.040
(0.74)  0.75)
October98  -0.072  0.082
(1.29)  1.49)
November98  -0.033  0.036
29(0.59)  0.64)
December98  -0.111  0.114
(2.12)*  2.18)*
January99  -0.093  0.086
(1.89)  1.74)
February99  -0.139  0.126
(2.93)**  2.64)**
March99  -0.160  0.158
(3.29)**  3.25)**
April99  -0.076  0.075
(1.40)  1.37)
May99  -0.004  0.012
(0.07)  0.20)
June99  -0.039  0.036
(0.70)  0.64)
Observations  2002  2002
F-Testfor  Joint Significance
Income Quartiles[X2(4)]  14.72**  6.33*
Age Categories[X2(4)]  2.53  6.63
Education Categories[x2(3)]  18.02*  2.80*
Month Categories  [X2(l1)]  6.22**  3.01**
District Fixed-Effects[X 2(10)]  0.80  14.38
(not reported)
Robust z statistics  in parentheses
^ significant at  10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
Note: Coefficients are marginal probabilities.
30Table R7: Armenia 1996 Adult (>=18)  Sample
Multinomnial Logit Regression
Dependent Variable:  Type of Health Provider  Sought if Sick
Note: No health care  sought is the comparison group
Independent Variables
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
Diagnostic  Polyclinic  Hospital  Fyelcher  Other
Eligible Category
Disabled  0.736  0.346  0.750  -1.585  -0.218
(2.53)*  (1.69)  (7.24)**  (1.36)  (0.40)
Belong to  -0.144  -0.070  0.079  0.292  0.547




Age 29-39  -0.081  0.036  -0.118  0.636  -0.859
(0.42)  (0.11)  (0.57)  (2.04)*  (1.95)
Age 40-50  -0.289  0.209  -0.179  0.299  -0.253
(1.41)  (0.66)  (0.92)  (0.77)  (0.77)
Age 51-61  -0.268  0.390  -0.154  -0.059  -1.035
(0.78)  (1.60)  (0.69)  (0.10)  (3.58)**
Age > 61  -0.558  0.170  -0.165  0.507  -0.693
(1.51)  (1.05)  (0.72)  (1.58)  (1.69)
Female  -0.378  0.013  -0.381  -0.204  0.052
(2.16)*  (0.12)  (3.75)**  (1.07)  (0.26)
Secondary  0.227  0.197  0.198  0.851  0.177
(0.68)  (1.40)  (0.89)  (1.41)  (0.49)
S-Secondary  0.386  0.251  0.140  0.678  0.087
(0.74)  (1.95)  (0.52)  (2.49)*  (0.22)
Household Wealth
Q2  -0.446  -0.033  0.001  -1.086  -0.178
(1.51)  (0.17)  (0.01)  (2.01)*  (0.61)
Q3  0.441  0.148  0.430  0.049  0.208
(1.24)  (1.25)  (1.35)  (0.07)  (0.46)
Q4  0.923  0.269  0.704  0.375  0.623
(2.49)*  (1.69)  (2.79)**  (0.95)  (1.56)
Rich  0.608  0.151  1.177  -0.007  0.820
(2.18)*  (0.52)  (3.80)**  (0.02)  (2.69)**
Post-Sec  0.679  0.299  0.106  -0.322  -0.176
(1.49)  (2.38)*  (0.40)  (0.54)  (0.35)
Community Characteristics
Urban  0.106  0.344  0.357  -0.823  0.530
(0.32)  (1.26)  (1.25)  (0.89)  (1.25)
Constant  -2.891  -1.513  -1.856  -3.387  -2.830
(4.05)**  (4.61)**  (5.45)**  (5.39)**  (7.40)**
Observations  2684  2684  2684  2684  2684
31F-Tests for Joint  Significance
Income=0[x2(4)1  22.86**  4.71  34.87**  21.83**  13.57**
Age=O[X2(4)]  5.14  18.19**  2.06  8.04*  40.45**
Edu=O[X2(3)]  6.76A  6.71A  1.27  6.61^  3.35
District=01x2(l0)I  17.20A  24.07**  37.06**  77.37**  34.68**
Fixed-Effects
(not reported)
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses
A significant at  10%; * significant at 5%;  ** significant at 1%.
32Table R8: Armenia  1998/99 Adult (>18) Sample
Multinomial Logit Regression
Dependent Variable: Type of  Health Provider  Sought if Sick
Note: No health care sought is the comparison group
Independent Variables
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
Diagnostic  Polyclinic  Hospital  Fyelcher  Other
Eligible Category
Disabled  0.671  0.306  0.509  0.057  -0.359
(3.78)**  (0.52)  (2.32)*  (0.11)  (0.47)
Belong to  -0.329  -34.175  -0.746  0.628  -33.402




Age 29-39  0.008  0.866  -0.281  0.116  0.288
(0.03)  (1.25)  (1.10)  (0.20)  (0.33)
Age 40-50  0.048  -0.402  -0.289  -0.041  0.243
(0.21)  (0.51)  (1.18)  (0.07)  (0.28)
Age 51-61  0.098  0.276  -0.936  -0.515  0.730
(0.41)  (0.38)  (3.22)**  (0,78)  (0.86)
Age > 61  0.274  -0.398  -0.548  -0.187  0.976
(1.22)  (0.52)  (2.19)*  (0.33)  (1.22)
Female  0.330  -0.105  0.060  0.005  0.186
(2.56)*  (0.28)  (0.39)  (0.02)  (0.47)
Secondary  0.278  0.193  0.264  -0.223  0.342
(1.18)  (0.27)  (0.88)  (0.40)  (0.50)
Special-Sec  0.623  -0.394  0.526  -0.435  1.015
(2.42)*  (0.46)  (1.61)  (0.67)  (1.39)
Post-Sec  0.873  0.792  0.846  -0.145  -0.169
(3.26)**  (0.95)  (2.48)*  (0.21)  (0.19)
Household Wealth
Q2  0.296  0.988  -0.429  0.070  1.012
(1.42)  (1.34)  (1.71)  (0.13)  (1.42)
Q3  0.673  0.956  0.218  0.414  0.834
(3.27)**  (1.32)  (0.95)  (0.78)  (1.10)
Q4  0.503  0.892  0.109  0.187  0.627
(2.46)*  (1.22)  (0.47)  (0.34)  (0.82)
Rich  0.580  0.727  -0.056  0.736  1.399
(3.01)**  (1.00)  (0.25)  (1.49)  (2.02)*
Community Characteristics
Urban  0.472  -0.690  -0.132  0.161  0.250
(2.67)**  (1.31)  (0.64)  (0.36)  (0.46)
Month Fixed-Effects
August98  -0.138  0.044  0.185  0.910  0.298
(0.52)  (0.06)  (0.49)  (1.08)  (0.31)
September98  0.178  -0.712  0.393  0.736  -0.678
(0.66)  (0.77)  (1.  o)  (0.85)  (0.54)
October98  -0.863  -0.174  0.360  0.646  -0.515
33(2.58)**  (0.21)  (0.97)  (0.71)  (0.41)
November98  -0.199  -1.252  0.127  0.782  -33.501
(0.68)  (1.08)  (0.32)  (0.87)  (0.00)
December98  -0.634  -0.916  -0.088  0.094  -33.372
(2.18)*  (1.12)  (0.22)  (0.10)  (0.00)
January99  -0.583  -1.285  0.024  -33.557  0.642
(2.13)*  (1.41)  (0.07)  (0.00)  (0.75)
February99  -0.768  -2.168  -0.628  0.036  0.963
(2.84)**  (1.86)  (1.65)  (0.04)  (1.14)
March99  -1.272  -1.181  -0.043  0.084  -0.999
(4.14)**  (1.41)  (0.12)  (0.09)  (0.79)
April99  -1.049  -0.954  0.464  0.743  0.458
(3.19)**  (1.16)  (1.26)  (0.86)  (0.44)
May99  -0.222  -1.252  0.141  0.876  1.514
(0.73)  (1.06)  (0.35)  (0.95)  (1.75)
June99  -0.299  -0.561  0.184  -33.385  0.296
(1.00)  (0.60)  (0.48)  (0.00)  (0.29)
Constant  -2.207  -3.873  -1.296  -4.574  -5.340
(4.48)**  (2.43)*  (2.39)*  (3.10)**  (3.48)**
Observations  2002  2002  2002  2002  2002
F-Tests  for Joint  Significance
Income=0[X2(4)]  13.63**  2.21  6.88  3.06  4.80
Age=0[X2(4)]  2.88  7.13  12.10**  1.29  3.03
Edu=O[X 2(3)]  17.09**  3.20  9.80**  0.57  4.57
Month=0[x2(11)]  44.70**  9.25  13.24  4.56  11.63
District-0[X 2(10)]  19.45**  4.38  19.56**  5.70  3.47
Fixed-Effects
(not reported)
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses
A significant at 10%;  * significant at 5%; ** significant  at 1%.
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